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961 F.3D 193 (2D CIR. 2020)
Meghan Jackson*
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr. v. Ministry
of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 961 F.3d 193 (2d
Cir. 2020) centers around a bronze horse figurine dating back to
the Geometric period (8th century BCE), which is “of Corinthian
type.”1 For an object that has been in existence well over 2,000
years, relatively little is known about the figurine. According to
the limited provenance, the earliest date the figurine is known was
May of 1967 when it was sold by a prominent auction House in
Switzerland to an undisclosed buyer.2 Later, though it is unknown
exactly when, the Bronze horse was acquired by Robin Symes
from the previous auction purchaser, and on November 3, 1973,
Howard and Saretta Barnet acquired the bronze horse from Mr.
Symes.3 The Bronze Horse was displayed in the Barnet’s New
York home for more than twenty years, and when Howard passed
away, Saretta became the sole owner.4 In 2012, Saretta transferred
ownership to the 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Trust (“the
Trust”), and when she passed away in 2017 the Trust consigned
the figurine for auction at Sotheby’s Auction House in New York
City.5

* Meghan Jackson is a 2022 DePaul University College of Law J.D. Candidate.
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for the Future Award for the study of Art in the Law.
1
Barnet v. Ministry of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 391 F. Supp.
3d 291, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
2
Id. at 297.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr. v. Ministry of Culture &
Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 961 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 2020).
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Sotheby’s intended to auction the bronze horse in New York
City on May 14, 2018.6 In anticipation of auction, Sotheby’s
published an auction catalogue, detailing the bronze horse,
attributing its country of origin as Greece, and dating the figurine
to the 8th Century BCE.7 Several days prior to the intended auction
date, on May 11, 2018, the Greek Ministry of Culture emailed a
letter (the “demand letter”) to Sotheby’s, making the following
several points:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

That Greece was aware of the bronze horse intended to be
auctioned,
That the bronze horse is of Greek origin,
That Greece has no record to prove that the bronze horse
left Greece legally,
That under Greek law, all movable ancient monuments
belong to Greece, and there are potential criminal
consequences to illegal acquisition of such monuments,
Greece is in full compliance with international treaties
preventing the illicit export of cultural property,
That there is in force a Memorandum between the United
States and the Government of the Hellenic Republic that
restricts import of archaeological objects during a certain
period which this figurine falls under,
And finally, arguably most importantly, asking Sotheby’s
to withdraw the bronze horse from auction and repatriate
the object to Greece, reserving the right to take necessary
legal action for such repatriation.8

Sotheby’s did indeed withdraw the figurine, but instead of moving
forward with repatriation, they responded to the email, asking
Greece to provide more evidence to support their claim to
ownership.9 Greece did not respond, and Sotheby’s, in conjunction

6

Id.
Id.
8
Id. at 197-98.
9
Id. at 198.
7

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol31/iss1/6

2

Jackson: Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr. v. Ministry of Culture & Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 961 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2020)
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

158

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

VOLUME 31

[Vol. XXXI:

with the Trust, sued in the Southern District of New York for
declaration of ownership.10
II.

BACKGROUND OF GREEK PATRIMONY LAWS AND THE
FSIA

Before delving into the court decisions, it is important to
understand Greece’s Patrimony Laws, as they are central to the
outcome of this case. “The material remains of ancient Greece
played a crucial role in shaping national consciousness and
legitimizing the modern Greek state…”11 With a cultural heritage
as rich as Greece’s, it is obvious that protection of such heritage
would be of great importance, and that importance is reflected in
the country’s legislation. One such law was the Antiquities Act of
1932, stating that “[a]ll antiquities movable or immovable found in
Greece and in any State land, in rivers, lakes and at the bottom of
the sea, and in municipal, monasterial and private estates from
ancient times onwards, are the property of the state.”12 The
Antiquities Act also places fines up to 4,000 drachmas on those
who come to possess property of Greece and who do not declare it
as soon as possible, as well as potential imprisonment up to sixth
months.13 In 2002, Greece enacted the On the Protection of
Antiquities and Cultural Heritage in General Act. This Act states
that “the Greek State shall care for the protection of cultural
objects originating from Greek territory whenever they have been
removed from it” and “wherever they are located.”14 The 2002 Act
also provides that “[m]oveable ancient monuments dating up to
1453 belong to the State in terms of ownership and possession, are
imprescriptible and extra commercium,” meaning not subject to
private ownership.15

10

Id.
Daphne Voudouri, Law and the Politics of the Past: Legal Protection of
Cultural Heritage in Greece, 17 IJCP 547 (2010).
12
Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr., 961 F.3d at 196.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
11
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Across the pond, the United States has laws instructing its
courts on how to deal with litigation involving other countries.
While the U.S. court system prides itself on resolving conflicts and
seeking justice, foreign policy and diplomacy discourage the
courts from entangling foreign sovereigns in disputes that could
affect the relationships between the U.S. and other nations. For
this reason, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)
establishes the default rule that a foreign sovereign is typically
immune from all litigation in United States courts, unless one of
the specific exceptions in the statute applies.16 Since its enactment
in 1976, the FSIA has been continually litigated, despite the fact
that the intention was actually to create a uniform rule of sovereign
immunity. This case is no exception, because the central issue is
whether one of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity
applies such that Greece is subject to jurisdiction in the United
States courts to determine the true ownership of the figurine.
The issue in this case centers on whether the so called
“commercial activity exception” applies to actions taken by
Greece in an attempt to claim ownership of the bronze horse. More
specifically, the parties dispute the direct-effect clause of the
commercial activity exception, which abrogates sovereign
immunity when an action is based upon “an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.”17 To establish jurisdiction on that
basis, the action must be (i) based upon an act outside the United
States; (ii) that was taken in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign sovereign; and (iii) that caused a direct effect in the
United States.18 The first element requires the court to identify the
act of the foreign sovereign that is the “core” of Plaintiff’s suit, the
specific act for which relief is sought.19 Next, the court must
identify the activity in connection with which the core act was
taken. It is crucial to determine whether that act is commercial and
16

Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 352 (1993).
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
18
See Petersen Energia Inversora S.A.U. v. Argentine Republic & YPF S.A.,
895 F.3d 194, 204 (2d Cir. 2018).
19
OBB v. Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 396 (2015).
17

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol31/iss1/6
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can be exercised by private citizens, or if it is a “power peculiar to
sovereigns.”20 As the statute itself provides, “[t]he commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose.”21 The third and final
element simply requires an affect “followed as an immediate
consequence of the defendant’s activity,” and the effect “need not
be ‘substantial’ or ‘foreseeable.’”22
III.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DECISION

Despite the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity laid
out by the FSIA, the District Court held that the direct-effect
clause of the commercial activity exception was satisfied in this
case, and therefore the court had jurisdiction over Greece.23 The
court’s analysis started by recognizing the “core” claim from
which this dispute arises was the Defendant’s demand letter, and
its error in “asserting an ownership interest in the Bronze Horse
when demanding that Sotheby’s withdraw the figure from the
auction.”24
With the first element satisfied, the District Court moved to
the core question of the case, whether Greece was engaged in
commercial activity. “[T]he issue is whether the government’s
particular actions (whatever the motive behind them) are the type
of actions by which a private party engages in commerce.”25 The
court describes this activity as “attempting to intervene in the
market to assert and enforce its purported rights,” and classifies
that characterization as the type of commercial activity private

20

Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 570 U.S. 349, 360 (1993) (quoting Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
21
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
22
Atlantica Holdings v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC, 813 F.3d
98, 108 (2d Cir. 2016).
23
Barnet, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 302.
24
Id. at 299.
25
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (emphasis in
original).
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persons can, and often do, engage in.26 The District Court rejected
Greece’s contention that they were acting as sovereigns by
explaining that “[w]hile the purpose of sending the Demand Letter
may have been to fulfill the Ministry’s constitutional mandate to
protect Greece’s cultural heritage, the nature of the act is
analogous to a private citizen attempting to enforce his property
rights.”27
The final element is whether the Demand Letter had a
direct effect in the United States. This element is obvious, as the
Demand Letter caused Sotheby’s to withdraw the Bronze Horse
from the auction one business day before it was set to take place.28
With every element of the direct-effect clause of the
commercial activity exception satisfied, the District Court held
that it had jurisdiction over Greece to hear the case.29 The effect of
this holding is that any foreign state who sends a demand letter
claiming ownership over an object has effectively waived its
sovereign immunity under the FSIA and thereby agreed to be
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Displeased with the
outcome, Greece appealed to the Second Circuit.30
IV.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DISTRICT
DECISION

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the
District Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.31 The Court of
Appeals agreed with the lower court that the core act challenged in
this suit was the Defendant sending of the demand letter.32
However, that is where the agreement ended. According to
the Court of Appeals, the District Court erred in their conclusion
26

Barnet, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 300.
Id. (emphasis in original)
28
Id. at 301.
29
Id. at 302.
30
Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr. v. Ministry of Culture &
Sports of the Hellenic Republic, 961 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2020).
31
Id. at 195.
32
Id. at 200.
27
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that the act was commercial in nature rather than sovereign.33 The
Court of Appeals explained that the District Court incorrectly
treated the act of sending the letter as the core act and the related
commercial activity required by 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), which, the
court said, is impossible because “a single act cannot be
undertaken in connection with itself.”34 Instead, the Court of
Appeals concludes that “Greece undertook the act of sending the
letter in connection with its claim of ownership over the figurine
pursuant to its patrimony laws.”35 The court categorizes this claim
of ownership as sovereign because “Greece has claimed ownership
over the figurine by adopting legislation that nationalizes historical
artifacts and by enforcing those patrimony laws.”36 This
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Demand Letter sent by
Greece explicitly invokes such national laws at the same time the
assertion of ownership is made.37 As the court makes clear, “[n]o
private party could nationalize historical artifacts and regulate the
export and ownership of those nationalized artifacts – that is the
activity in connection with which Greece sent its letter.”38 The
Court of Appeals completely disagrees with the District Court’s
“nature v. purpose” analysis, saying that the nature of the act was
not a commercial claim of ownership, but “the enactment and
enforcement of laws declaring the figurine to be state property.”39
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the directeffect clause of the expropriation exception is not satisfied, and
therefore the District Court has no jurisdiction over Greece, and
the case was remanded for dismissal.40 The court recognized that
“to ‘hold otherwise and look only to the fact of a mere claim of
ownership for purposes of our commercial activity analysis would
allow the exception to swallow the rule of presumptive sovereign

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr., 961 F.3d at 201.
37
Id. at 200.
38
Id. at 202.
39
Id. at 201.
40
Id. at 203.
34
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immunity codified by the FSIA.’”41 Shortly after the case was
decided, a spokesperson for Sotheby’s said “[w]hile we are
disappointed with yesterday’s decision, it does not impact what is
at the heart of this matter—there is, and remains, no evidence to
support Greece’s claim to ownership of the bronze sculpture. We,
together with our client, are reviewing next steps.”42 These next
steps, however, did not result in further litigation, as no appeal was
ever made to the United States Supreme Court.
V.

IMPACT ON FUTURE LITIGATION

The Court of Appeals’ reversal and dismissal seemingly hinges
on two errors by the district court: assuming that a single demand
letter could satisfy both the act and the related commercial
activity, and its classification of Greece’s assertion of ownership
as commercial not sovereign. Looking further into the first point,
the Court of Appeals explained that there ought to be an act and a
separate commercial activity to which the act is connected, citing
just the statute itself and a 1994 case from the D.C. Circuit, which
only hints at such point.43 Addressing the second error made by
the District Court, the Court of Appeals then seems to alter course,
explaining that the act of sending the letter was “in connection
with its claim of ownership over the figurine pursuant to its
patrimony laws.”44 The Court of Appeals effectively found that a
sovereign activity may exist within the same act that it had just
decided could not contain commercial activity. While that
undermines the logic the Court of Appeals used to disagree with
the District Court, it also raises an interesting question: what if
Greece didn’t have patrimony laws? Assume, in arguendo, that
Greece’s demand letter was sent in connection with its claim of
ownership over the figurine but lacked the patrimony laws
explicitly nationalizing objects such as the bronze horse. Private
41

Id. at 202 (quoting Anglo-American Underwriting Management v. P.T.
Jamsostek, 600 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2010).
42
Kate Brown, Sotheby’s Just Lost Its Lawsuit Against Greece over 8th-Century
BC Horse Statue—and the Decision May Have Lasting Implications for the
Trade, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/barnet-case-sothebys-1883349.
43
Barnet as Tr. of 2012 Saretta Barnet Revocable Tr., 961 F.3d at 202.
44
Id.
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citizens often assert claims for ownership of a commercial nature.
It seems that the Court of Appeals decision then leaves open the
possibility that other foreign sovereigns lacking such ownership
laws attempting to assert ownership via demand letter may be
subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts, while others like Greece
enjoys immunity.
This case is similar to many FSIA claims because boiled down
to a decision of whether the act taken by Greece was commercial
or sovereign in nature. As is made obvious by the difference in
interpretation between the District and Appellate Courts, this is not
always an obvious distinction. There are acts that can easily be
identified as sovereign: the exercise of police power45, seizure of
farmland46, granting or denying exchange rate compensation akin
to subsidy47, or even “clandestine surveillance or espionage.”48
There are, on the other hand, acts that courts have deemed
commercial, such as: entering and subsequently breaching
contracts,49 and issuance of bonds.50 It is also a difficult but crucial
to the FSIA standard, that in making that determination a court
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) (“The conduct boils down
to abuse of the power of its police by the Saudi Government, and however
monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the
power of its police has long been understood for purposes of the restrictive
theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature.”).
46
Sequeira v. Republic of Nicaragua, 815 F. App'x 345, 351 (11th Cir.
2020), cert. denied sub nom. Sequeira v. Nicaragua, No. 20-428, 2020 WL
7132327 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2020) (“The commercial-activity exception does not
apply here because Sequeira's amended complaint was based on the alleged
taking of his land, which is not a commercial activity.”).
47 Corzo v. Banco Cent. de Reserva del Peru, 243 F.3d 519, 525 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“the BCRP's act of granting or denying exchange rate compensation is clearly a
sovereign activity, and it is therefore not subject to suit in the United States on
this particular claim.”).
48
Broidy Capital Mgmt., LLC v. State of Qatar, 982 F.3d 582, 594 (9th Cir.
2020) (“We have little difficulty in concluding that, without more, a foreign
government's conduct of clandestine surveillance and espionage against a
national of another nation in that other nation is not ‘one in which commercial
actors typically engage.’”).
49
Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 2000), as
amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Aug. 17, 2000).
50
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 607.
45
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must look at the nature, and not at the purpose of an act to
determine whether it was commercial or sovereign.51 At face
value, sending a demand letter asserting ownership seems more
similar to entering a contract or issuing a bond than it does
espionage or exercise of police power.
Indeed, it seems more logical to look at the demand letter as
having the nature of asserting ownership, and the purpose of
enforcing its patrimony laws. This scenario feels similar to that in
Weltover, where Argentina unsuccessfully argued that its issuance
of bonds was “to fulfill its obligations under a foreign exchange
program designed to address a domestic credit crisis, and as a
component of a program designed to control that nation's critical
shortage of foreign exchange.”52 The Supreme Court was
unconcerned with why the bonds were issued, just that the issuance
of bonds is a commercial activity. So logically, it should not
matter why Greece sent a demand letter asserting ownership, just
that it did so, and such is the kind of commercial act that “can also
be exercised by private citizens.”53
A final issue with the outcome of this case was a point
made by Sotheby’s: Greece had not at any point come forward
with any documentation to indicate actual ownership. Would it not
have been easier to provide Sotheby’s with proper documentation
and move forward with repatriation privately than to go through
two years of litigation? It is not completely unreasonable to guess
Greece’s refusal to provide documentation was simply because it
does not have any. If that is the case, how can Greece assert
ownership pursuant to its Patrimony Laws as a sovereign state, if it
not certain it does indeed have a rightful claim to the figurine?
There are many cases, such as this one, where the merits of a claim
and jurisdiction cannot be easily separated.54 It leaves the courts
with the almost impossible decision of deciding what facts ought
51

Id. at 617.
Id. at 616.
53
Id. at 614.
54
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co.,
137 S. Ct. 1312, 1318-1319 (2017).
52
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to be analyzed at the outset of a case involving a foreign
sovereign, and there is likely no right way to approach such a task.
What then, should Sotheby’s have done differently?
Ultimately, the Second Circuit chose the path that does not
offend the principles of sovereign immunity. The consequences of
the District Court’s decision would likely have had a chilling
effect on countries attempting to assert ownership over
nationalized object, which is certainly an undesirable outcome.
Under the FSIA, waiver of immunity is one way a foreign state
can be subject to litigation in the United States, and obviously
initiating an action in a U.S. court constitutes a waiver.55 The
District Court’s opinion would subject a foreign state to
jurisdiction for sending a demand letter the same way it would for
filing a complaint, effectively providing a massive hole in the
shroud of immunity enjoyed by foreign states.
An objective of the FSIA was to codify a the so-called
‘restrictive’ principle of sovereign immunity, as presently
recognized in international law. “Under this principle, the
immunity of a foreign state is ‘restricted’ to suits involving a
foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to
suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure gestionis). This
principle was adopted by the Department of State in 1952 and has
been followed by the courts and by the executive branch ever
since. Moreover, it is regularly applied against the United States in
suits against the U.S. Government in foreign courts.”56
The Second Circuit opinion serves as a “reset” on the
theory of restrictive sovereign immunity and effectively makes
countries freer to assert ownership claims without worrying about
being subject to U.S. litigation. Indeed, the United States has
formally recognized Greece’s ownership claims to many objects in
the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of
the United States and the Government of the Hellenic Republic
Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Categories of
55
56

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2021

11

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6
JACKSON: BARNET AS TR. OF 2012 SARETTA BARNET REVOCABLE TR. V. MINISTRY OF CULTURE & SPORTS OF THE
HELLENIC REPUBLIC, 961 F.3D 193 (2D CIR. 2020)

2021] BARNET AS TR. OF 2012 SARETTA BARET REVOCABLE TR.

167

Archaeological and Byzantine Ecclesiastical Ethnological Material
Through the 15th Century A.D. of the Hellenic Republic (“the
Memorandum”).57 The Memorandum recognizes a desire to
“reduce the incentive for pillage of irreplaceable archaeological
material of Greece…” and both countries agree to take certain
steps to meet this goal, including the U.S. returning any objects of
a certain type to Greece if forfeited to the U.S.58 Therein lies an
ideal that Greece has a right to assert ownership over certain
objects, the bronze horse being of the appropriate type, and
subjecting Greece to potential litigation every time it makes such a
claim of ownership would likely have a significant impact its
willingness to do so, while undermining the entire purpose of the
Memorandum.
Because of the worldwide nature of the market surrounding art
and cultural heritage, cases revolving around these objects will
often face jurisdictional obstacles, and invoking any exception to
the FSIA is always a tough hurdle for claimants. Each artwork or
cultural object has a unique story to tell, which results in litigation
involving intricate facts that Congress could have never
anticipated in drafting the FSIA. It then falls on the courts to
resolve such complicated issues, and Barnet is no exception.

57

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Gov't of the United States of
Am. & the Gov't of the Hellenic Republic Concerning the Imposition of Imp.
Restrictions on Categories of Archaeological & Byzantin, T.I.A.S. No. 11-1121
(Nov. 21, 2011).
58
Id.
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